The corpus › Formula Parameter
Minimum State Share
The floor under the state share percentage. R.C. 3317.017(C) computes the share as
(base cost per pupil − per-pupil local capacity) / base cost per pupil, and then says: “If
the result is less than 0.10, the state share percentage shall be 0.10.” Division (B)(1)
states the same rule from the other side — a district whose local capacity exceeds 90% of its
base cost is paid base cost per pupil × 0.10 × enrolled ADM. verified the section
parameter/minimum-state-share · 3 nodes point here
It doubled, and the doubling is not in permanent law. The plan was enacted with 5% inference; the 10% above is what H.B. 96 wrote into a section that applies only to FY2026 and FY2027 verified. So the most consequential distributional parameter at the top of the wealth range is one a biennium sets and the next biennium need not re-set.
For 138 of 609 districts it is the whole answer. Their state share is not computed from valuation, adjusted gross income, median income, the 60/20/20 blend, the sliding capacity rate or the fortieth-highest-district benchmark. It is a tenth. The local capacity measure’s entire apparatus determines nothing for roughly a fifth of Ohio’s districts. verified
What this repository computed Contents
Not what Ohio publishes. Figures derived here from committed fixtures, each one citing the test that reproduces it.
It censors the data it floors Contents
Where the floor binds, per-pupil local capacity is not recoverable from published aid by subtraction. All that can be said of those 138 districts is that their capacity exceeds 90% of base cost; how far it exceeds it is not published and cannot be inferred from the payment. Any analysis that regresses aid on wealth across all 609 is fitting a censored dependent variable at the top of the range. verified
The charge-off counterfactual records the same problem from the other direction: 138 districts are the ones whose local capacity the minimum state share censors, so it cannot value them under both regimes on the same basis. verified crates/regime-diff
And it makes the formula’s response to base cost non-linear Contents
A dollar of extra base cost per pupil is a dollar of extra state aid per pupil for a district
on the formula, because local capacity does not move when base cost does. For a district on
this floor it is ten cents. So the aggregate response to a base cost increase depends on how
many districts are on the floor, and that count is itself a function of base cost. verified crates/project
The cost-input refresh scenario prices the effect: of the run’s total, $118.7m does not reach districts because 138 of them keep only a tenth of what the refresh computes for them. verified
Properties Contents
| Name | Minimum state share percentage |
|---|---|
| Unit | percent |
| Kind | Uncodified in substance and codified in form, which is the case the taxonomy was built to separate and this one sits between. The value is in the Revised Code — R.C. 3317.017(B)(1) and (C), stated as 0.10 — so it is not uncodified the way the enrollment and performance supplements are: it is citable and a reader can look it up. But the section opens "This section shall apply only for fiscal years 2026 and 2027", and H.B. 96 is what put 0.10 in it. The number's authority is a budget act; its residence is permanent law; and its life is two years.So "what would have to happen for this to change" has an unusual answer: nothing. It does not have to be repealed or amended. If the next budget act writes a different number into the next version of this section, or writes none, the 10% simply stops. Recorded here because the four-kind taxonomy in the four kinds of parameter distinguishes "in the Revised Code" from "in a budget act" and this is both at once. |
| Values over time | |
FY2022 0.05 H.B. 110, stated in its greenbook as a formula
box rather than as a rate verified
FY2023 0.05 unchanged verified
FY2024 0.10 raised by H.B. 33; reaches 55 districts (9%) verified
FY2025 0.10 the same, reaching 68 districts (11%) verified
FY2026 0.10 R.C. 3317.017(C), as amended by H.B. 96 verified
FY2027 0.10 the same section, the same two-year scope verified
FY2028 — the section does not apply verifiedThe department's own Notes sheet states 0.1 for FY2026 and FY2027, which is how this repository first established the value. The section says it too, and the section is the stronger source: a departmental note records what the department did, and the statute records what it was told to do. verifiedThe two-branch form is as old as the parameter. statutory_basis below observes that the current section states the floor twice — a 0.90 threshold on the capacity ratio and a 0.10 floor on the percentage — and that the two are algebraically equivalent. H.B. 110's greenbook writes the FY2022 rule in exactly that shape, as a pair of branches at 95% and 5%: If Per-pupil local capacity amount / District's base cost per pupil > 95%, then
Per-pupil state share of base cost = District's base cost per pupil x 5%verified So the floor has never been a rule bolted onto the formula; it is the second branch of the state share itself, and doubling it in FY2024 moved the threshold from 95% to 90% at the same time. inference | |
| Statutory basis | R.C. 3317.017(B)(1) and (C), read. Both divisions state the floor, once as a threshold on the capacity-to-base-cost ratio (0.90) and once as a floor on the resulting percentage (0.10). They are the same rule and they are algebraically equivalent, which is worth knowing because a reader who finds one and not the other may conclude the floor applies only to the payment or only to the percentage. verified ohio-laws |
| Simulation key | Policy::minimum_state_share, defaulting to project::panel::MINIMUM_STATE_SHARE.One of the four levers the scenario runner exposes, and the only one that had no node in this class until now. The others are the guarantee rule (Guarantee Funding Base), the base cost scale (Base Cost Per Pupil) and the two phase-in percentages (FSFP Phase-In Percentage). |
| Sensitivity | Binds at the wealthy end and nowhere else, so raising it is a transfer toward districts that need it least and lowering it is a cut concentrated on the same districts. That is the opposite shape from almost every other lever here, and it is why the floor is the one to check before reading a distributional claim about a base cost change. inference The number of districts it binds is not fixed. Raising base cost lifts districts onto the floor — their capacity stops exceeding 90% of a larger base cost — and lowering it pushes them off. So the count of 138 is a property of the FY2027 model rather than of the parameter. verified the mechanism, and the 138 as a FY2027 count Interacts with the guarantee. A district on both the floor and the guarantee is insulated twice, and the two mechanisms are usually described separately. inference |
Links Contents
| Instance of | Formula Parameter |
|---|---|
| Read by | FSFP Local Capacity Measure |
| Valued in | FY2026-27 Biennium |
| Set by | Am. Sub. H.B. 96 (2025) — FY2026-27 Budget |
| Altered by | FSFP Cost Input Refresh vs. Freeze |
| Altered by | Phasing Out the Temporary Transitional Aid Guarantee |
| Sourced from | Ohio Revised Code — the sections this corpus cites |
| Sourced from | FY27 TRAD State Foundation Funding Calculator |
Also mentions
Pointed at by
| FSFP Local Capacity Measure | Governed by |
|---|---|
| Local Capacity Percentage | mentions |
| Transportation Cost Rates | mentions |
What this node does not hold Contents
the division of R.C. 3317.017 that set 5% — The act is settled — H.B. 110 of the 134th, whose LSC greenbook states the floor as a formula box — and the division within the section it enacted is not. Ohio Laws' version archive for the section is where the FY2022 text would be read; a greenbook states a rule and not the division that carries it.