FSFP Local Capacity Measure

That 60/20/20 split is the substance of the reform. Property alone treated a district with expensive housing and modest household earnings as wealthy; splitting the income term into an aggregate measure (total AGI, which rises with population and with a few very high earners) and a median measure (which does not) captures a district whose totals look healthy because of concentration at the top. inference

The scaling factor is where the progressivity actually lives, and it is a sliding scale, not a constant. A district’s local capacity percentage is set by the ratio of its federal median income to the state’s, benchmarked against the 40th highest district on that ratio: at or above that benchmark the rate is 2.5%; below the state median it is the district’s own ratio times 2.25%; between the two it interpolates. verified A district at half the state median income is charged local capacity at roughly 1.125% of its blended wealth, while a wealthy district pays 2.5% — so the measure is progressive in rate as well as in base.

Both wealth terms are computed as the lesser of the most recent year and a three-year average — valuation from TY20 against TY18-20, income from TY19 against TY17-19 in the FY2022 calculation. verified Taking the lesser is a deliberate protection: a district whose valuation spikes on a single reappraisal is not immediately charged for it.

The benchmark is a rank, not a value # ↑ Contents

R.C. 3317.017(A)(4)(c)–(d) writes a rank, not a value. Districts are ranked by the ratio of their federal median income to the statewide median, and the district with the fortieth highest ratio is the point at which the capacity percentage caps at 0.025. verified

What this repository computed # ↑ Contents

Not what Ohio publishes. Figures derived here from committed fixtures, each one citing the test that reproduces it.

That is a large fact about how the measure actually operates. For those 138 districts the entire apparatus above — the three wealth terms, the 60/20/20 blend, the progressive rate schedule, the 40th-highest-district benchmark — determines nothing. Their aid is a flat percentage of base cost. The measure’s discrimination stops at the point where a fifth of Ohio’s districts sit, and doubling the floor moved that point without changing anything the formula computes.

It also censors the data. Where the floor binds, local capacity per pupil is not recoverable from published aid by subtraction: all that can be said is that it exceeds 90% of base cost. verified

Against the mechanism it replaced # ↑ Contents

verified crates/regime-diff, the corpus’s only aligned component pair, run at FY2027 base cost with only the local share substituted and the charge-off taken against recognized valuation at TY2024

The income terms do what they were built to do, and they do it in both directions. Ottawa Hills Local — high income, unremarkable valuation — is charged 101% more by local capacity than a 23-mill charge-off would ask. Jefferson Township Local — high valuation, low income — is charged 22% less. The district the charge-off treated as the richer of the two is the one this measure treats as poorer. verified

The half that gets less attention is the second one. Local capacity is usually described as catching wealth the charge-off missed; it also relieves districts whose property wealth overstated what their residents could bear — and on the charge-off’s own base that half is the larger one. At FY2027 base cost 316 of 606 districts would have received more under the charge-off against 290 under this measure, and the median district is $45 per pupil worse off under the plan. A reform described only as tightening is being described by half. verified

Across wealth the change of mechanism favors the top, and only the top. Mean gain per pupil against the charge-off, by valuation quintile: −$118.47, −$231.81, −$294.46, −$365.14, +$632.23. Only the wealthiest quintile does better under this measure; the four below it all did better under the charge-off, and the gradient runs the wrong way — the poorer the quintile, the less it loses. The minimum state share is part of the top quintile’s gain — the charge-off had no floor and would zero out 65 districts entirely — and here it is most of it: splitting that quintile by whether the charge-off would have zeroed it gives $900.40 to the 65 that it would and $326.41 to the other 57. verified

So this measure is more discriminating than the charge-off about which districts are wealthy and simultaneously more generous to wealthy districts overall. Those are not in tension — the first is about the ordering and the second about the level — but a claim that cites one without the other is quoting half the result. inference

The shape of that incidence is not an artifact of the year; the level of the comparison partly is. Recognized valuation defers most where a reappraisal was largest, and Ohio’s TY2023-24 cycle deferred 8.20% of taxable value against the roughly 2% the Legislative Service Commission puts the long-run effect at, so the statewide margins above would be narrower in an ordinary year. verified

The measure is published per district # ↑ Contents

The FY2027 calculator’s Detail_SFPR sheet carries [b1] Per Pupil Capacity Amount for every district. Nothing here read that sheet. The corpus instead derived capacity as base cost minus the state’s share of it, which is exact for 471 districts and impossible for the 138 where the minimum state share binds — and those are precisely the districts where capacity is highest and the subtraction understates it, so they were censored rather than reported wrong. verified

The two agree where both exist, to 0.46% at worst, which is the retrospective check on the subtraction and the reason to trust the eleven phases of work built on it. The 138 are no longer censored. verified crates/project/tests/finances_and_the_guarantee.rs

The calculator reproduces the department’s figure exactly # ↑ Contents

verified crates/local-capacity, in crates/xcheck/tests/against_the_departments_own_capacity.rs crates/local-capacity was written from the statute and had never been run against anything. It is right.

How this was got wrong first, because the route matters more than the result. An earlier pass reconstructed the inputs from the workbook’s Valuation & Income sheet and inferred the rest, producing a capacity 4.4% light with a residual that correlated with none of the three terms — a near-uniform scale error, which is the signature of a shared input rather than a structural mistake. Chasing it turned up a sheet named Local_Capacity that works the entire statute step by step, with its own labels, [V1] and [I1] through [C7].

Every inferred input was the wrong one:

term                        inferred              published            (Columbus)
median income               Ohio median 31,555    federal 46,395       [I5], adjusted
tax returns                 142,349               272,169              [I6], adjusted
statewide median income     41,502                54,546.64            [I7], federal
benchmark ratio             1.4151 reconstructed  1.46504              [C5], published

On the published inputs the residual is zero. The 4.4% gap was not a finding about Ohio; it was the cost of not opening a sheet. verified

The bottom two rows are one error, not two, and both said something about the measure that is not true. Substituting the Ohio median for the federal one moves every district’s figure, so it also moves their median and the ranking built on it — the 41,502 and the 1.4151 are the 31,555 propagating, counted a second and third time. Read from the federal column both statewide constants come back exactly: the median of the 609 district medians is $54,546.6375, which is [I7] to the last digit, and the fortieth-highest ratio is Westlake City’s 1.46503636, which is [C5]. verified crates/local-capacity, held to the department’s figures in crates/xcheck/tests/against_the_departments_own_capacity.rs

So nothing in this measure is a number anybody chooses, and the entry above recording [I7] as “published rather than derivable” and [C5] as discretionary was a wrong input read as a fact about the statute. R.C. 3317.017(A)(4)(a) defines the denominator as the median of the district medians and (A)(4)(c)-(d) defines the benchmark as a rank over them; both are what the text says they are. That also closes the question of the fortieth ratio’s value — what remains open is only why the fortieth. verified

Why the fortieth, out of 609, is not stated in the section — and no budget analysis states it either. Of the twelve committed LSC greenbooks and both editions of H.B. 96’s, exactly one mentions the benchmark: H.B. 110’s, which sets it out twice in a formula box inside an account of the capacity percentage that carries no justifying word anywhere in it. verified crates/project

That absence is informative rather than empty, because LSC argues for the threshold this one replaced. H.B. 94 does not merely state parity aid’s 80th percentile; it spends two paragraphs and a chart on it — “the use of the 80th percentile as the threshold helps reduce disparities in local spending above the adequacy level”, against the fact that “the top wealthiest 20 percent of school districts … consistently have much higher per pupil revenues” — and H.B. 95 restates the reason the following biennium. Giving the reason is what LSC does when the act supplies one. verified

A threshold written as a rank is the house convention, and this one reversed its direction # ↑ Contents

The rank itself is not the novelty. Every Ohio equalization formula this corpus can reach names a district rather than a dollar figure: equity aid at its FY1998 peak equalized to the 48th percentile district, H.B. 94’s own equity aid to the 118th lowest-wealth district and its parity aid to the 490th, H.B. 119 narrowed who qualified for parity aid while leaving that 490th in place, and tier one targeted assistance was still on the 490th under H.B. 59 twelve years later. verified

What changed is which end the count starts from, and that follows from what the two devices do. A rank counted from the bottom names the districts that qualify — parity aid paid the 490 poorest and nobody else. A rank counted from the top names the districts that are capped: every district is charged local capacity, and the fortieth is where the charge stops being progressive. So the earlier answer does not carry over, and LSC’s own conversion is what says so: it puts parity aid’s 490th of 612 at the 80th percentile, where the fortieth highest of 609 leaves 569 districts below it and sits at the 93rd. verified

It was never a budget decision, which is why no budget analysis explains it # ↑ Contents

The empty trace is structural rather than accidental. H.B. 1 of the 134th — the bill the plan was drafted in, which passed the House and died in the Senate four months before H.B. 110 enacted the formula — already writes “the fortieth highest ratio”, three times, in the division that survives verbatim in force today. A greenbook explains what a budget changed; this budget did not choose the number, it adopted a drafted plan whole. The absence is not LSC declining to explain a choice. There was no choice in front of it to explain. verified

What this does not say. Not that the number was arbitrary. Whatever work chose forty sits upstream of H.B. 1, in the plan workgroup’s own documentation, and no budget analysis would carry it. The claim is that the fourteen analyses do not answer it, that the one place Ohio’s greenbooks do justify a rank threshold is the regime this measure replaced, and that the question has to be put to the plan rather than to the budget. inference

The section names a certification the state was not making # ↑ Contents

R.C. 3317.017 takes every income term “as certified under section 3317.021 of the Revised Code” — four times, once for each income input it uses, and those four are the section’s only citations of it; the valuation term cites nothing. This corpus had never fetched that section.

It certifies less than the formula asks for, and did so from the day the plan was enacted: until 30 September 2025 division (A)(5) named the district’s total federal AGI and its median Ohio AGI, where (A)(3) of the capacity blend needs the median federal AGI and a count of returns. Neither was certified, for four years. verified crates/project/tests/what_the_tax_commissioner_was_never_asked_to_certify.rs

That is the account this node has been missing for its own recorded error. An earlier pass did not guess Ohio median income out of the air; it is the median the state’s certification statute actually produces, and reading the formula section’s requirement against the certification section’s supply is how the substitution became plausible. inference

H.B. 96 moved the gap instead of closing it. Item 9 of the act substituted the median for the total at (A)(5) rather than adding it, so the aggregate term at R.C. 3317.017(A)(2) now cites a certification that no longer exists; and the returns count it added at (A)(6) is limited to FY2026 and FY2027 while (A)(5) beside it is permanent, so the two halves of one product expire on different schedules. None of it reaches a payment — the department computes both terms and this corpus reproduces its answer for 609 of 609 districts — but a blend whose inputs have never all been certified is a different object from one whose inputs have. verified

The decision is stable. The distribution is not. # ↑ Contents

That last question framed itself correctly and answered itself wrongly. The corpus holds two years of the calculator — the department serves FY2027 and the Internet Archive has FY2026 — and the catalog entry for the earlier one recorded a decision not to extract its per-district tables, on the ground that they “are the FY2027 model’s a year earlier and the counts are very nearly identical”. That was measured on bus miles and rider counts, which are a survey a year apart and are stable. This column is not. verified crates/project

The decision — the fortieth-highest district’s income ratio, [C5] — moves from 1.46670942 to 1.46503636, a tenth of a per cent. The rate [C6] it caps moves 0.13% at the median. And the per-pupil amount [b1] those two produce moves $472.44, which is 9.3% in one year. verified

That is one half of a subtraction, and the other half is frozen # ↑ Contents

A district’s state share of its base cost is (base cost per pupil − capacity per pupil) / base cost per pupil. The capacity side reads the three most recent tax years and the window rolls forward annually: FY2026’s sheet heads them TY2024, TY2023 and TY2022, FY2027’s heads them TY2025, TY2024 and TY2023. The cost side does not roll. H.B. 96 retains FY2022 cost inputs and maintains the FY2024 statewide averages through FY2027, so the median district’s base cost per pupil moves $4.11 while its capacity moves $472.44. verified

The consequence is arithmetic:

median district's state share           FY2026  41.40%   FY2027  36.00%
the state's share of the aggregate      FY2026  35.35%   FY2027  31.52%
districts the 10% floor binds for       FY2026  105      FY2027  138

The median district’s state share falls 4.11 percentage points in one year, and it falls in 540 of 609 districts. 33 districts that were on a computed share in FY2026 are on the floor in FY2027. The 4.11 is the median of the per-district falls and the 5.40 between the two levels above is the fall in the median district, which is a different statistic; both are reported because quoting either alone invites the other reading. verified

And the fall is the capacity side alone. Pair FY2027’s own base cost with FY2026’s capacity and the median state share comes back to 41.23% — a sixth of a point from where FY2026 published it. Freezing one side of a subtraction while the other tracks the property market is a reduction in the state’s share that requires no vote and appears in no act. verified

What this does not say. Not that state aid fell. FY2026 ran at an 83.33% phase-in and FY2027 at 100%, so foundation funding rises across the same interval; what falls is the fraction of a district’s costed education that the state’s formula assigns to the state. It has been shown the comparison, and this node recorded otherwise for want of reading the other edition. LSC’s analysis of H.B. 96 as introduced carries a section headed “State share of the base cost, property values, and local capacity” that names both clocks — base cost inputs held “at FY 2022 levels”, the statewide weighted capacity per pupil projected to rise 8.2% then 7.2% — attributes the falling state share to “increases in property values and income levels used in computing district per-pupil local contributions”, states the consequence as a series of statewide averages running 38.4% in FY2025 to 35.0% and then 32.2%, and says in the next sentence that this “in turn reduces projected funding for the categorical components”. verified crates/project

Those are LSC’s projections for a bill as introduced and this corpus’s are computed from the department’s two enacted models, and they agree: 35.0% against the 35.35% above, 32.2% against 31.52%, and a one-year fall of 2.8 points against 3.8. Two methods, two vintages and two editions of the bill land within a point of each other, which makes the finding a reconciliation as well as an answer about awareness. The series has a published beginning too — H.B. 110 put the statewide average state share percentage at 42.8% in FY2022. verified

The edition that describes the law is the one that is silent # ↑ Contents

That section appears in the redbook and nowhere else. H.B. 96’s greenbook keeps the phase-in table and one clause of its Quick look, “while maintaining FY 2022 base cost inputs”, and carries neither the capacity growth rates nor the state share percentages nor the sentence joining them. A reader who goes to the analysis of the act as passed — the document about the law — gets one clock and no account of what runs against it. verified

Awareness is not intent. The legislature was told what holding the cost side still would do to the state’s share and enacted the freeze; no analysis says the divergence was the object of the exercise, and this node does not claim it was. inference

The valuation is the lesser of two, and the rule is one-sided # ↑ Contents

R.C. 3317.017(A)(1)(a) takes the minimum of a district’s three-year average valuation and its most recent taxable value; the income side takes the same shape. Under rising valuations the average is lower, so the district is charged on a lagged figure; under falling valuations the recent year is lower and the fall passes straight through. 602 of 609 districts are on the lagged branch and 7 on the immediate one — the seven whose valuation fell, none by more than 1.15%.

The rule therefore never charges a district on the higher of its two measures. That makes it a floor on the state’s share wearing the clothes of a smoothing device, and the asymmetry is invisible in any one district’s figures. verified crates/local-capacity, held to the department’s figures in crates/xcheck/tests/against_the_departments_own_capacity.rs

And it is the charge-off’s instinct in a new device. The mechanism this replaced also lagged revaluation, through recognized valuation — a three-year phase-in of the inflationary increase. Two regimes, the same judgment that a reappraisal should not reach state aid all at once, and two different implementations. A reader told only that the plan “uses a three-year average” would not see that it is the successor to something. verified

What it divides by, and where that lands # ↑ Contents

The measure’s numerator is unambiguously resident. Assessed valuation is the district’s whole tax base and federal adjusted gross income is its residents’ income; neither moves when a child leaves for a community school. The denominator does. Table SD-1 counts 222,923 children resident in a district that its base cost enrolled ADM does not — Youngstown’s resident count is 2.30 times the one it teaches and Columbus’s 1.69 — so the measure appears to charge a district for wealth supporting children it does not teach. verified crates/project

Against base cost it does not, and the reason is arithmetic rather than policy. R.C. 3317.017 divides all three wealth terms by base cost enrolled ADM — (A)(1)(b), (A)(2)(b) and (A)(3)(c), in as many words — and division (B) multiplies the residual back by enrolled ADM. The count cancels. What Ohio charges is (0.6 V + 0.2 AGI + 0.2 M × R) × rate, a number of dollars set by wealth alone, and it comes to $8.894bn across the 609. A departing pupil costs a district exactly one base cost per pupil and never more: the residual is zero for the 80 districts whose two pupil counts coincide and positive — in the district’s favor — for every other, because base cost enrolled ADM is a three-year maximum that takes a year to follow a departure down. verified crates/project

Nor is the departed child funded twice. R.C. 3317.022 makes the community and STEM school unit and the four scholarship units funding units of their own, and gives the first of them the aggregate base cost at (A)(1)(b) with no state share term at all. Every community-school, STEM and scholarship deduction left in the committed extract reads “as that division existed prior to September 30, 2021” and survives only inside the FY2020 funding base R.C. 3317.02(N)(1) reconstructs. The chapter still deducts for two things — a county DD board’s preschool services at R.C. 3317.0213(C) and an enforcement remedy at R.C. 3327.02(F)(2) — and neither is this channel. So there is no deduct to net against, which is what makes the question answerable rather than merely arguable; the department’s own transfer lines bound the same conclusion from the other end, at DistrictRecord::total_transfers. verified

The categorical channel is where the denominator lands instead # ↑ Contents

Four of the six categoricals — special education, English learners, gifted and career-technical — are multiplied by the district’s state share percentage, which R.C. 3317.022(A)(3), (5) and (6) attach to districts by name and to no other funding unit. A percentage is a ratio of two per-pupil figures, so nothing cancels and the denominator passes straight through it.

$2.432bn of special education, English learner and career-technical entitlement is computed for the 609 districts, and the local share takes 66.6% of it. The community and STEM school unit is charged none. Columbus City’s state share percentage is 10.25%, so the state pays a community school nearly ten times what it pays Columbus for the same category-six pupil — and Columbus’s percentage is what it is because two in every five of its resident children are in neither the numerator nor the denominator of the measure that sets it. verified crates/project

The plan already reaches for a resident count, one section away # ↑ Contents

R.C. 3317.0217(C)(1) builds targeted assistance’s wealth per pupil from the same two certified numerators this section supplies at (A)(1)(a) and (A)(2)(a), and divides them by enrolled ADM less those open-enrolling in plus those open-enrolling out. The department’s published [D] reproduces from exactly that, for all 609. So the plan does have a resident denominator — and it takes exactly one of the ten channels R.C. 3317.03(A)(2) lists. It moves 2,098 pupils statewide against the 222,923 above, which is nine-tenths of one per cent of it. Community school, STEM and scholarship students are corrected for in neither measure. verified crates/project

The exposure, priced in both directions # ↑ Contents

Divide local capacity by Table SD-1’s resident count instead and the aid this measure reaches moves from $4.513bn to $5.355bn — $842.5m. That is not a re-basing anyone should want: it would credit a district with a lower capacity per pupil on account of children the state already funds in full through another funding unit. What it measures is how much of the charge the denominator is carrying, and where. verified crates/project

119 districts would lose by it, $57.5m in total and up to $2,671 a pupil. They are the net open-enrollment-in districts, whose resident count is smaller than the one they teach; the divergence has two signs and a correction priced on the gainers alone does not see them. 33 of the 138 districts on the 10% floor would come off it. verified crates/project

And the divergence orders nothing. The correlation between a district’s resident-to-funded ratio and its published state share percentage is 0.0657 over 609. Youngstown has the largest divergence in the state and a 71.0% state share; Columbus has the ninth and a 10.2% one. The hypothesis that the denominator is what makes the poorest urban districts’ shares low is refuted on its own terms — what it does instead is ride on top of the progressivity, and land on the categoricals. verified crates/project

The two treatments are not one division apart # ↑ Contents

This node left as a live question whether the General Assembly intends the state share percentage to discount a district’s special education and English learner funding by a ratio computed on a count that excludes the children it has lost, on the ground that “nothing in R.C. 3317.022 says either way”. It says so nine times. The section does not state the qualifier once in a general provision; it repeats “if the funding unit is a city, local, or exempted village school district, the district’s state share percentage” inside each of the six special education categories at (A)(3)(a) and each of the three English learner categories at (A)(5)(a). verified crates/project, what_the_general_assembly_was_shown

And LSC put it in front of legislators in every biennium of the plan’s life, with a reason attached. H.B. 110’s analysis says the categoricals for community and STEM schools are computed as they are for districts “except that a state share percentage is not applied”; H.B. 33 and H.B. 96 give the ground — “since these schools do not have taxing authority” — and H.B. 96 puts the consequence in a sentence: “the state share for community and STEM schools is effectively 100%”. verified crates/project

That reason is about the recipient. It answers why a community school is charged nothing and says nothing whatever about which children the district’s percentage is divided by. The denominator gets one sentence in fourteen analyses, in the ADM section rather than beside the percentage it sets: the budget “replaces ‘Formula ADM’ with ‘Enrolled ADM’ which counts the number of students being educated in a district or school”, against a prior-law count that began with students residing in the district. verified crates/project The only reason LSC ever gives for the denominator is the three-year maximum, which is about the count’s vintage and not about who is in it. So the two treatments are not symmetric unknowns. One is written out nine times and explained three times; the other is a definitional consequence that no document connects to it.

The General Assembly priced this effect, and then repealed the price # ↑ Contents

H.B. 110 created supplemental targeted assistance for the 36 districts whose enrolled ADM was under 88% of their total residential ADM and whose FY2019 wealth index exceeded 1.6 — $56.4m in FY2022. H.B. 96 eliminated it, and the repeal paragraph states this node’s own unanswered question as the thing being eliminated: those districts “might appear relatively wealthier on a per-pupil basis because of changes in how the formula in place since FY 2022 counts students relative to the previous formula and thus receive less state aid”, $52.5m to 36 districts in FY2025. verified crates/project

The question was therefore not unasked. It was asked, priced, and the price struck in the biennium this corpus models.

What a correction confined to the categoricals would cost, and who it would reach # ↑ Contents

Re-basing is two operations and the $842.5m above is their sum. $659.1m of it is relief on the local charge itself — the part that credits a district for children another funding unit already pays for in full, which is the part nobody should want. $183.4m is the categorical channel, where the percentage is a ratio and nothing cancels. Confining the correction there leaves R.C. 3317.017 untouched and re-computes only the ratio R.C. 3317.022 multiplies by. verified crates/project

It costs a fifth of the wholesale figure and harms a tenth as much: $191.2m to 385 districts against $7.8m off the same 119, where wholesale re-basing took $57.5m off them. The losers lose through the charge, not through the percentage, so the caveat this node attached to the wholesale number — that a correction priced on the gainers alone does not see them — very nearly dissolves once the correction is confined. verified crates/project

And it lands almost exactly on the repealed supplement, for the districts that supplement reached. The 36 qualifiers would take $48.7m of it, against the $52.5m they were being paid until FY2026. But $142.6m would go to districts the supplement never covered, because its second gate was a wealth test: Columbus City teaches 65.6% of its resident children and would take $41.7m on its own, and its FY2019 wealth index is 1.197, under the 1.6 threshold. Cincinnati fails the same gate at 1.044. The instrument aimed at this effect excluded the two districts carrying the most of it. verified crates/project

The open-enrollment adjustment is a choice, not an inheritance # ↑ Contents

R.C. 3317.0217(C)(1) subtracts the students of R.C. 3317.03(A)(1)(b) and adds those of (A)(2)(d): open enrollment in and out. (A)(2) runs (a) through (j) — community school, alternative school, college, open enrollment, educational service center, compact district, nonpublic scholarship, provider scholarship, STEM school, college-preparatory boarding school. The adjustment takes one of ten, from the subsection it is citing. verified crates/project

It cannot be an artifact of the section predating the choice channels. R.C. 3317.0217’s current text was written by H.B. 110, the same act that replaced the residence count with the attendance one, twenty-four years after Ohio’s first community school. The section number is older and belonged to parity aid in 2001, which is a trap this corpus already records — H.B. 94 — but the number is not the provision. verified crates/project

Prior law put those children in the denominator and out of the multiplier # ↑ Contents

There was no partial residence count for H.B. 110 to rebuild badly. Under the H.B. 59 regime total ADM was “the number of all students who reside in the district” and formula ADM was total ADM less 80% of JVSD ADM — a residence count for every channel but one, and that one carved out only because JVSDs are paid by a separate formula rather than by deduction, “so that these students are not double counted”. Targeted assistance’s wealth per pupil divided by formula ADM, so the choice children were in the denominator. verified crates/project

They were taken out of the multiplier instead, and LSC states the reason: “an adjustment is made to the formula ADM of each district so as to not credit the district with targeted assistance for students educated through these programs.” The netting list is e-schools, EdChoice, Jon Peterson and 75% of non-e-school community schools — and open enrollment is not in it. verified crates/project

The two corrections are not complements, though. Prior law’s netting list names three of the ten channels R.C. 3317.03(A)(2) lists — community school, EdChoice, Jon Peterson — and the new denominator adjustment reaches one, open enrollment. Together they reach four. Alternative schools, College Credit Plus, educational service centers, compact districts, STEM schools and college-preparatory boarding schools are reached by neither. verified crates/project

What is continuous is narrower and exact: the one channel prior law let a district keep targeted assistance for is the one channel the new denominator adds back. Open enrollment’s deduct was computed on the formula amount and career-technical weight, so targeted assistance never followed an open-enrolling child, and prior law did not net one out. R.C. 3317.0217(C)(1) reproduces that treatment in a regime where the count changed from residence to attendance. inference

And this is the component the denominator reaches furthest into # ↑ Contents

R.C. 3317.0217(C)(1) is the one place the plan already concedes the principle. It divides weighted wealth by a residence-flavored count and multiplies the resulting rate by enrolled ADM — so targeted assistance already measures wealth against the children a district is responsible for and pays against the children it teaches. The question it leaves is only how far that count reaches.

Run the same denominator out to Table SD-1’s resident count, holding the enrolled-ADM multiplier fixed, and the wealth tier moves from $1.030bn to $1.463bn — $433.1m, to 489 districts, against $0.3m off seven. That is 2.4 times what the four categoricals carry, and it is a channel neither this node nor #384 had priced. verified crates/project

The reconstruction is checked against the department’s published [F] before the counterfactual is run on it, because the failure mode is silent: [D] divides by the adjusted count and [F] multiplies by enrolled ADM, and using the adjusted count for both overstates the tier by a factor of 38 while still returning a plausible number. verified crates/project

open Whether the General Assembly weighed the reach of R.C. 3317.0217(C)(1)‘s denominator when it wrote it. See issue #399.

A hazard for anyone reading the supplement’s name backwards # ↑ Contents

“Supplemental targeted assistance” under H.B. 64 was an agricultural payment — a district’s agricultural real property percentage less 10%, times 40% of the formula amount, and “only districts with more than 10% agricultural real property qualify”. H.B. 110’s payment of the same name is keyed on residence against attendance and reaches, in LSC’s words, “primarily lower wealth, urban districts”. The name is continuous across the greenbooks and the program is not. verified crates/project

There is no millage term, so the measure cannot see a levy # ↑ Contents

The blend is valuation and income, and the rate that scales it is computed from income. Nothing in it is a tax rate anybody votes on: the department’s FY2027 model carries 165 columns and the only one of them that is a rate at all is capacity_rate, R.C. 3317.017(A)(4)‘s sliding scale. verified crates/project Two districts with the same tax base and twenty mills between their effective rates are charged the same local capacity to the cent.

So a district is charged for its tax base and never for its tax rate. Passing a levy costs it no state aid and failing to pass one gains it none, which dissolves rather than answers the question of whether the plan rewards low local effort: effort is not an input. What the measure does charge for is assessed value, and that charge is real — about 1.2 cents of state aid per dollar of taxable value once the rise has worked through (A)(1)(a)‘s three-year average. It is 0.6 x capacity rate, amplified by the four categoricals R.C. 3317.022 multiplies by the state share percentage. verified crates/project

It reaches 268 districts of 609. For the other 341 it is exactly zero: 138 sit on the minimum state share, where the floor censors the whole quantity the charge would come out of, and the rest are held by the guarantee or by [K], which puts the loss straight back. verified crates/project

Of the 268, 181 are above the twenty-mill floor, where H.B. 920’s reduction factors mean the value they are charged for yields them no revenue whatever — see that parameter for what the two sides of the boundary collect. verified crates/project

Where any agency exists is a school board’s part in consenting to property tax exemptions, an exemption being the one instrument that lowers the base this charge is levied on. open Nothing in this repository models abatement and no catalog record reaches district-level exempt value, so whether 1.2 cents is large enough to move a consent vote is not answered here.