The corpus › Formula Parameter

Disadvantaged Pupil Impact Aid Per-Pupil Amount

$422 a pupil, times a district's economically disadvantaged index, times its count. The $422 and the index's squaring are in statute; the 65/35 blend that builds the count is in no section of the Revised Code and is the department exercising a delegation.

parameter/dpia-per-pupil-amount · 3 nodes point here

The largest categorical in the plan is one dollar figure with two multipliers on it. R.C. 3317.022(A)(4)(a)(i): $422 × the district's economically disadvantaged index × the number of students who are economically disadvantaged as certified under R.C. 3317.03(B)(21). verified the section

The index is squared, and that is statutory. R.C. 3317.02(I)(1) defines the economically disadvantaged index and the squaring is in the definition rather than being a departmental convention. verified

The count is where the delegation lives. The certified figure is a blend of two counts — the economically disadvantaged ADM at 65% and the directly certified ADM at 35%. Those two weights appear in no section of the Revised Code. R.C. 3317.03(B)(21) tells the department what to certify and the department decides how; the 65/35 is that decision. verified

So a single line of the formula carries three different kinds of authority: a legislated dollar amount, a legislated squaring, and a delegated blend that moves the count the dollar amount multiplies.

What this repository computed Contents

Not what Ohio publishes. Figures derived here from committed fixtures, each one citing the test that reproduces it.

The delegated half is the half that moved a district by 45% Contents

The blend’s first term is a prior-year count. Edgerton Local’s enrollment fell from 504.48 in FY2025 to 342.38 in FY2026, so its FY2025 disadvantaged count of 497.21 is 98.6% of the enrollment it was measured against and 145% of the enrollment it is applied to. Three districts sit at 98.6% against the measurement year and differ only in how much they shrank. verified

Nothing in the statute produces that. The $422 is fixed, the index is defined, and the dispersion is entirely in a count built by a rule the Revised Code does not contain. A reader auditing this line against the section will not find the mechanism that generated the outlier. verified the arithmetic inference the reading

And a second vintage disagreement sits inside the same delegation Contents

H.B. 96 sets the directly certified term on “the ADM … for the fiscal year for which the DPIA payment is calculated”, and the LSC greenbook writes the FY2027 row out to match. The department’s FY2027 workbook carries FY2026 in that column — its own header says d1b FY26 Directly Certified ADM. So 35% of the count is a year behind what the act asks for. verified the workbook’s header and vintage table

DPIA is the one component with its own phase-in Contents

R.C. 3317.022 writes two bracketed interpolation terms, one for divisions (A)(1), (2), (3), (5), (6), (7) and (8) and one for (A)(4) alone, each against its own slice of the FY2020 funding base — and R.C. 3317.02(N)(2) anchors the DPIA slice to the district’s FY2019 DPIA payment rather than to FY2020. In FY2022 the general phase-in was 16.67% and DPIA’s was 0%, which under an interpolation means DPIA was paid at 100% of its FY2019 amount. verified

$422 has not moved since FY2022, which is an 11.27% cut in real terms Contents

H.B. 110 raised the amount from $272 to $422 for the plan’s first year and no act has moved it since; H.B. 96 carries it to FY2027. Deflated by CPI-U June, $422 set in FY2022 is worth $475.61 in FY2026 dollars — the amount has lost 11.27% of its value with the section that prints it unchanged on the page. verified crates/project

That erosion is shared exactly with all five gifted figures, because it is a property of the year an amount was set and of nothing else. The preschool flat grant, frozen since FY2014, has lost 28.63% the same way. verified

It is the largest single piece of what the freeze costs, and the reason is size Contents

Across the FY2027 model, paying DPIA at the $422’s FY2022 value would cost $66.7m more than the formula pays — half of the $133.2m the three frozen components lose together, on the same 11.27% erosion the gifted rates carry. Gifted loses $6.9m on the identical factor. The difference is that DPIA is ten times the money. verified

Unlike the preschool grant, most of this is absorbed before it reaches a district. DPIA sits inside [H] Foundation Funding, so the guarantee’s max catches it: of the $133.2m, $104.3m would reach districts and $28.9m would not. A district the floor holds is paid the same whether or not the rate keeps pace, which means the freeze is invisible to it now and would be invisible to it if reversed. verified

That is the argument for reading this parameter through its incidence rather than its rate. The $422 is a statewide number; what it is worth is not. inference

Properties Contents

NameDisadvantaged pupil impact aid per-pupil amount
Unitdollars-per-pupil
KindLegislated in the amount, delegated in the count, and expiring in both.

$422 is a digit in R.C. 3317.022(A)(4)(a)(i) and only an act moves it. The 65/35 blend is the department's, made under the certification delegation in R.C. 3317.03(B)(21), and a departmental decision needs no act at all — which is what makes it the harder half to audit: it is not written anywhere a reader would look for it.

Division (A)(4)(a)(ii) hands FY2028 and thereafter to the General Assembly, so the $422 has the same two-year life as almost everything else in the plan.

This node is the reason the taxonomy's delegated exists as a separate kind rather than being folded into uncodified. The blend is not absent from law by oversight; the statute deliberately assigns the decision, and "the department decided" is a different and more answerable provenance than "nobody has found it".
Values over time
FY2022  $422   set by H.B. 110, raised from $272 under the
               formula it replaced                              verified
FY2026  $422   R.C. 3317.022(A)(4)(a)(i)                        verified
FY2027  $422   the same division, same two-year scope           verified
FY2028  —      an amount calculated in a manner determined by
               the general assembly                             verified
Count construction, FY2027, delegated rather than statutory:
  0.65   economically disadvantaged ADM, FY2025                 verified
  0.35   directly certified ADM, FY2026 in the workbook against
         FY2027 in the act                                      verified
Statewide inputs behind those weights, from the committed panel:
  economically disadvantaged ADM   856,236
  directly certified ADM           474,197
The statewide economically disadvantaged percentage the calculator carries for FY2027 is 0.533380310606710. verified crates/project
Statutory basisR.C. 3317.022(A)(4) for the program and the $422; R.C. 3317.02(I)(1) for the index and its squaring; R.C. 3317.03(B)(21) for the certification the count rests on; R.C. 3317.02(N)(2) for the FY2019 anchor of DPIA's own phase-in slice. The component previously cited R.C. 3317.029, which does not exist. verified ohio-laws
Simulation keyproject::panel::categoricals::DPIA_PER_PUPIL, with DPIA_BLEND and DPIA_STATEWIDE_PERCENTAGE beside it.

The amount is a constant with no lever, and two things around it are levers now. Policy::phase_in_dpia moves how much of the FY2019 base a district is held at, separate from phase_in_general because the statute separates them; and Policy::dpia_directly_certified_weight moves the count — the 65/35 blend H.B. 96 wrote — with the statewide index rescaled so the total holds and only the distribution moves. The $422 itself still cannot be moved.
Written in formulas as
  • disadvantaged share
  • index, squared
  • blended count
SensitivityThe largest categorical, and the one whose sensitivity is least about its own rate. $422 scales the whole program linearly; the index squares, so it is the term that decides the distribution; and the count is a delegated construction that has already produced a district funded on 145% of its enrollment.

A proposal that raises the $422 is a proportional increase to every district in the program. A proposal that changes the 65/35 blend needs no legislation at all and can move individual districts by more. Only the first will appear in a fiscal note. inference

Interacts with its own phase-in rather than the general one, which is the trap: at a general phase-in of 50% and a DPIA phase-in of 0%, DPIA is paid in full at its FY2019 base while everything else moves halfway to the computed amount. The corpus read that the other way round for several phases. verified

What this node does not hold Contents

the departmental instrument that sets 65/35 — The weights are the department's decision under R.C. 3317.03(B)(21) and are not in the Revised Code. A rule in the Administrative Code, or the department's certification guidance, is where the decision would be written down.

the amount before FY2022, under the program's earlier names — $272 is the figure the plan raised from and is now sourced; what it was before that is not. The program predates the Fair School Funding Plan under other names, and no analysis in the committed greenbook series discusses it under any of them.