Evidence-Based Model

Structurally this is the answer to residual budgeting: the amount is built up from components rather than divided down from an appropriation, so the question “why this number” has an answer that does not reduce to “that is what was available.” inference

It operated for two fiscal years. H.B. 153 repealed it in 2011, before the third year of a ten-year phase-in. verified Because it never ran at its designed funding level, the model was never tested against the outcomes it was built to produce — the corpus can say what it would have cost but not what it would have achieved. inference Its two operating years also coincided with federal stabilization funding, so the state-share figures for FY2010-11 are not comparable to adjacent years without separating the federal component. inference

What this repository computed # ↑ Contents

Not what Ohio publishes. Figures derived here from committed fixtures, each one citing the test that reproduces it.

Its last run is still funding Ohio # ↑ Contents

The regime operated for two fiscal years, FY2010 and FY2011, and was repealed before the third. That makes it the shortest-lived regime in this corpus and, by one measure, the longest-acting: FY2011 is the first term of the anchor chain that funds nearly half of Ohio’s districts in FY2027. verified Bridge Formula

H.B. 153 did not compute a new starting point. It took each district’s FY2011 allocation, divided by a recalculated FY2011 ADM to get a per-pupil figure, and adjusted that figure by where the district’s charge-off valuation stood against the statewide median — the same charge-off valuation this regime used for the local share of the adequacy amount. A district that never cleared a guarantee afterwards has been carried on that figure through six re-anchorings. verified

So a corpus that reads only current-law documents will find no trace of this regime in any district’s FY2027 funding, and it is there — sixteen years down, inside [H2]. What is not established is how much of any particular district’s base is still the FY2011 term. open

The local share it subtracted was a charge-off, at a rate on two bases # ↑ Contents

The node states the valuation the local share used and never the rate. It was 22 mills, and the base depended on where the district sat against the twenty-mill floor — total taxable valuation for a district whose class 1 effective current expense rate was 20.1 mills or lower, recognized valuation for every other. verified crates/project Under the law this regime replaced the rate was 23 mills of recognized valuation for all districts, so the model both cut the rate and moved the districts nearest the floor onto the larger base — the direction that surprises, since those are the districts least able to raise the revenue being assumed. It is the only entry in this corpus’s charge-off series that needs two rows. See Local Share Charge-Off Millage.

How much of the state budget the model actually touched # ↑ Contents

Ohio wrote the Evidence-Based Model into a new chapter of the Revised Code, R.C. 3306, rather than amending the school-funding chapter it replaced. That chapter reaches 1 line of the state budget, in 3 editions of the Catalog of Budget Line Items, and appears nowhere else in the other 15 — GRF 200550, Foundation Funding, in 2009, 2010 and 2011. Every other education appropriation went on citing the chapter it had cited before. verified crates/project

The displaced chapter moves with it. R.C. 3317 authorizes 10 of the department’s line items in the 2006 and 2008 editions and 6 in each of the model’s three, does not reach ten again until the Fair School Funding Plan era, and stands at 13 in the 2025 edition. The appropriation record dates the regime without being asked to. verified

And the last of the three citations is the one worth reading twice. The 2011 edition authorizes Foundation Funding under R.C. 3306 by Am. Sub. H.B. 153 of the 129th General Assembly — the act that repealed the model. For one biennium the formula was appropriated under the chapter of the regime being dismantled, which is what a repeal that leaves the payment running looks like in the budget. verified

What this cannot say is how much money moved. A line item’s legal basis is its authority, not its amount, and 200550 carries every district’s foundation payment in every regime — so the chapter citation dates the model and measures nothing about it. open

It abolished the per-pupil base cost and went on paying one # ↑ Contents

The regime has no statewide base cost per pupil, and that is a fact about the model rather than a gap in the record. LSC states it: the new model “is also largely based on the number of students in a district, but there is no specific formula amount per pupil”, because what drives its cost is the teacher compensation amount, which varies by district. Ohio then went four fiscal years without one — this regime’s two, and the two of the bridge formula that replaced it, which pays each district its own FY2011 aid. verified crates/project

Community schools kept theirs. H.B. 1 sets a base cost formula amount of $5,718 for FY2010 and $5,703 for FY2011 for community school payments, and multiplies their special education and career-technical weights by $5,732 — the repealed regime’s last district figure, frozen. H.B. 153 then cut the transfer rate to $5,653. So the per-pupil amount survived in exactly the place it was used to move money out of districts, and it fell $79 across the four years — 8.90% in constant dollars, because four years in which the formula had no price for a pupil were four years of prices rising anyway. verified

A regime that replaced a per-pupil price with a resource build-up still needed a per-pupil price to charge a district for a pupil it did not teach, and nobody rebuilt that one. See Base Cost Per Pupil for the whole series. inference