The corpus › Formula Parameter
Targeted Assistance Rates
Millage, written as decimals: 8 mills on the gap to median weighted wealth, and 14 mills on the median against 11.2 on the district's own. The 0.8 eligibility floor is those two divided — neither gate in the section is a separate decision.
parameter/targeted-assistance-rates · 1 node point here
Targeted assistance pays a district the sum of a capacity amount and a wealth amount, and the two are built differently. verified R.C. 3317.0217
The capacity tier takes the gap between statewide median weighted wealth and the district’s own, at 0.008 on each side, and then scales it by district size: zero below 200 enrolled ADM, 5% of the computed amount from 200 to 400, a linear ramp from 5% to 100% between 400 and 600, and the whole amount at 600 and above. Weighted wealth is itself a blend — 60% of the valuation term and 40% of the aggregate income term from R.C. 3317.017, which is a different blend from the 60/20/20 the local capacity percentage uses. verified
The wealth tier is where the arithmetic stops being symmetric. The formula is
[(median weighted wealth per pupil × 0.014) − (the district's weighted wealth per pupil × 0.0112)] × enrolled ADM, and the two coefficients are not the same number. A district
exactly at the median does not get zero: it gets median × 0.0028 × ADM. The tier pays
something to every district down to a wealth index of 0.8, below which it pays nothing.
verified the section
That asymmetry is easy to read as a transcription error and it is in the statute. Both figures appear in the same bracketed expression in division (C)(4)(b), to four and three decimals respectively. verified
They are mills, and this section is the one document that does not say so. R.C. 3317.0217
uses the word “mill” nowhere. LSC’s analysis of the act that enacted it states the same three
rates as “multiplied by 14 mills”, “multiplied by 11.2 mills” and “equal to 8 mills”, and
so does every account of every ancestor this component has had. Read in mills the wealth tier
says something plain: charge the median district 14, credit the district its own 11.2, pay the
difference. verified crates/project
What this repository computed Contents
Not what Ohio publishes. Figures derived here from committed fixtures, each one citing the test that reproduces it.
Neither eligibility gate is a decision Contents
The wealth bracket reaches zero exactly where a district’s wealth is 1.25 times the median — a wealth index of 0.8 — because 11.2 divided by 14 is 0.8. The floor stated in division (C)(4)(a) is the two coefficients and nothing else, and a proposal that “keeps the 0.8 eligibility floor” while moving either rate has described something that cannot be done.
The capacity tier’s index test at 1.0 has the same shape: its bracket is median − district,
which is zero at the median. Both gates prevent a negative payment; neither excludes a district
that would otherwise have been paid. So the section states nine constants and has seven degrees
of freedom. verified crates/project
The size ramp is a cliff and a ramp, not one shape Contents
Below 200 ADM a district gets nothing from the capacity tier. At 200 it gets 5%. That is a discontinuity: one pupil across the threshold is worth nineteen twentieths of the amount still withheld, and then the remaining 95% arrives gradually across the next two hundred pupils. A district of 199 and a district of 201 are treated as different kinds of thing. verified the schedule inference the reading
Whether the 200 floor is an administrative de minimis or a policy about very small districts
is not stated in the section, and what it does is not in doubt. The capacity tier pays a
millage on a shortfall between two whole-district totals, so its amount per pupil has no
bound at all as enrollment falls: Kelleys Island Local’s 3.51 pupils would draw $701,208.49
each, and all 17 districts at or below 400 enrolled ADM would draw more per pupil than the
$3,773.82 that is the most any full-rate district draws. The floor and the shelf are what
stand between that and the payment file. verified crates/project
The component this tier absorbed needed no such provision. Capacity aid multiplied by formula
ADM, so it went to zero with the pupil count, and its 2.5 cap bounded generosity per pupil
absolutely — per-pupil amount x multiplier x 2.5, one statewide ceiling. The plan dropped both
the multiplier and the cap when it restated the comparison as a difference rather than a ratio,
and the size brackets are what took their place. inference
Two blends of the same wealth terms, in two sections Contents
R.C. 3317.0217(B)(1) blends the valuation and aggregate income terms 60/40. R.C. 3317.017(A)(5) blends valuation, aggregate income and adjusted median income 60/20/20. They draw on the same certified data and produce different quantities, both called weighted wealth in the ordinary sense, and a reader who carries one definition into the other section will be wrong about which districts are poor. verified
The instrument is older than FY2014, and the threshold is what moved Contents
Targeted assistance succeeds parity aid, which ran FY2002 to FY2011 and equalized millage
to the wealth of the 80th percentile district on a blend of valuation with income — a millage
instrument, a wealth blend and a rank threshold, which is what this parameter is.
FSFP Targeted Assistance carries the
succession and the reason gap aid is not the ancestor. verified crates/project
The rate has moved six times in twenty-five years and the target has moved once. Parity aid equalized to the 80th percentile; H.B. 59’s tier one equalized to the 490th lowest district of 612, which is the same place; H.B. 110 moved it to the median and raised the rate from 6 mills to 14. Reading this parameter’s rates as a series without that is reading a rate against a moving base. verified
Three arithmetics since FY2014, and the committed analyses hold all three Contents
The unfilled: on this node sent the reader to Ohio Laws’ version archive. The twelve LSC
analyses this repository already holds carry more than a schedule of rates — they carry the
component’s shape, biennium by biennium. verified crates/project
FY2014-15, Am. Sub. H.B. 59. Two tiers, neither of them these. Tier one blended valuation and income 50/50 rather than 60/40, indexed against the statewide wealth per pupil rather than the median, equalized to the wealth of the 490th lowest district rather than to the median district’s, and charged 6 mills. The wealth index then entered the payment a second time as a multiplier, so that tier was progressive in wealth twice over where the current one is linear in the district’s own. Tier two paid up to 40 per cent of tier one again to districts whose property is at least a tenth agricultural — a term the plan has no counterpart for.
FY2016-19, Am. Sub. H.B. 64 and Am. Sub. H.B. 49. Targeted assistance keeps running and a second component joins it: capacity aid, charged on what a district raises with one mill, scaled by a ratio capped at 2.5, then multiplied by a dial the General Assembly turned twice in the four years the component existed — 2.75 in FY2016, 3.5 in FY2017, 4.0 in FY2018 and FY2019.
FY2022, Am. Sub. H.B. 110. “The budget replaces the targeted assistance and capacity aid components of the previous formula with a targeted assistance payment consisting of a ‘wealth amount’ and a ‘capacity amount.’” The nine constants this node carries are that act’s, and its analysis states every one of them, in mills.
FY2020-21 names neither, which is the bridge formula doing what that node records — paying the prior year rather than computing one. And H.B. 33 describes neither component at all, so the FY2024-25 evidence is absent rather than contrary: LSC writes about what an act changed, and this section was not amended.
Nothing has moved and the program has grown by a third Contents
LSC estimated targeted assistance at $988.4 million in FY2022 before guarantees and phase-ins — $738.5m of it the wealth amount, $250.0m the capacity amount. The FY2027 panel computes $1,364,333,154.32 for the same two tiers under the same nine constants, which is 38% more. verified crates/project
The medians are what moved. Both tiers pay a difference between the median district’s wealth and the district’s own, so a statewide revaluation that lifts every district’s property value proportionally lifts every gap proportionally and raises the program’s cost with no enactment at all. An equalization program built on a wealth gap rather than on a revenue shortfall gets more expensive as the tax base it equalizes grows. inference
Properties Contents
| Name | Targeted assistance rates |
|---|---|
| Unit | mills |
| Kind | Legislated, and expiring. Every coefficient and every bracket is a digit in R.C. 3317.0217, so only an act moves them while they apply — and the section opens "This section shall apply only for fiscal years 2026 and 2027", so nothing has to happen for them to stop. The medians the rates are charged against are measured: statewide median weighted wealth and median weighted wealth per pupil are statistics of the district panel, recomputed each year. So the rate is legislated and the thing it is charged against is not, which is the same two-level structure Base Cost Per Pupil has. |
| Values over time | |
Capacity tier, R.C. 3317.0217(B):0.6 / 0.4 weighted wealth blend — valuation term, aggregate income term 0.008 against median weighted wealth and against the district's, both sides < 200 ADM capacity amount is zero 200-400 0.05 of the computed amount 400-600 [0.95 × (ADM − 400) / 200] + 0.05 of it >= 600 the whole amount index < 1 capacity amount is zeroWealth tier, R.C. 3317.0217(C): 0.014 against median weighted wealth per pupil 0.0112 against the district's weighted wealth per pupil index < 0.8 wealth amount is zeroFY2026 and FY2027 only. verified The same nine, every year the plan has run. Am. Sub. H.B. 110 enacted them for FY2022 and stated each in mills; no later act's analysis restates any of them. verified What the section replaced, in the unit LSC used for it: verified
FY2002-03 9.5 mills parity aid, to the 80th percentile district, on a 2/3 : 1/3 blend
FY2008 8.0 mills the same target, 410 districts
FY2009 8.5 mills the same target, 367 districts, on a 75 : 25 blend
FY2010-11 — parity aid ends as a district payment; its wealth measure does not
FY2012-13 — the Bridge formula computes no equalization of this kind at all
FY2014-15 6 mills tier one, to the 490th lowest district, on a 50/50 wealth blend
FY2014-19 40% tier two, of tier one, at a tenth agricultural property or more
FY2016-19 one mill capacity aid, on three-year average valuation
FY2016 2.75 the capacity aid multiplier
FY2017 3.5 the same dial
FY2018-19 4.0 the same dial, and the last value it took
FY2020-21 — the Bridge formula computed neither
FY2022 14 mills / 11.2 mills / 8 mills, and one payment instead of twoFY2027 medians, from the department's model rather than from statute. verified crates/project median weighted wealth $392,151,306.63 median weighted wealth per pupil $276,708.97 What the two tiers pay together, summed over the panel's 609 districts: verified crates/project targeted assistance, statewide $1,364,333,154.32The medians are inputs and this is the outcome, which is why the node carried the first two for a year without the third. What LSC estimated the same two tiers at when the plan began, before guarantees or phase-ins: verified crates/project FY2022 targeted assistance $988.4 million FY2022 the wealth amount $738.5 million FY2022 the capacity amount $250.0 million | |
| Statutory basis | R.C. 3317.0217, read. (B) for the capacity tier including the size brackets, (C) for the wealth tier and its two coefficients, and (B)(1) for the 60/40 weighted wealth blend that refers back to divisions (A)(1)(a) and (A)(2)(a) of R.C. 3317.017. Payment is made under R.C. 3317.022(A). verified ohio-laws |
| Simulation key | project::panel::categoricals::TA_CAPACITY_RATE, TA_WEALTH_RATE, TA_WEALTH_OFFSET_RATE, TA_WEALTH_BLEND, TA_CAPACITY_MINIMUM_ADM, TA_CAPACITY_RAMP_START, TA_CAPACITY_FULL_AT, TA_CAPACITY_SMALL_SHARE and TA_WEALTH_INDEX_FLOOR.Nine constants, no lever. This is the parameter with the most separate dials in the plan and the scenario runner can move none of them. |
| Written in formulas as |
|
| Sensitivity | The 0.014 / 0.0112 asymmetry is the tier's whole progressivity, and it is not obvious from either number alone. Setting the two equal would make the tier pay nothing at the median and turn it into a pure gap-closing formula; the 0.0028 residual is what makes it pay every district above the 0.8 index. A proposal that "simplifies" the coefficients to one number is a substantive cut whatever number is chosen. inference The size brackets are the sensitivity nobody prices. They are counts, not dollars, so a fiscal note on a rate change will not show that a district crossing 200, 400 or 600 pupils moves discontinuously in the capacity tier regardless of its wealth. inference Both tiers are charged against medians of the district panel, so a change in the distribution of Ohio's district wealth moves this program with no enactment at all. inference |
Links Contents
| Instance of | Formula Parameter |
|---|---|
| Read by | FSFP Targeted Assistance |
| Valued in | FY2026-27 Biennium |
| Set by | Am. Sub. H.B. 96 (2025) — FY2026-27 Budget |
| Shares inputs with | Local Capacity Percentage |
| Sourced from | Ohio Revised Code — the sections this corpus cites |
| Sourced from | FY27 TRAD State Foundation Funding Calculator |
Also mentions
Pointed at by
| FSFP Targeted Assistance | Governed by |
|---|
What this node does not hold Contents
the divisions each rate sits in, before FY2026 — The committed LSC analyses settle the rates and the shape for every biennium since FY2014, but a greenbook states a formula rather than citing a division. Which division of which prior section carried the 6 mills, or the capacity aid multiplier, is still only in Ohio Laws' version archive.
whether tier one survived FY2019 unchanged — H.B. 49 restates only the capacity aid multiplier; it does not restate tier one's target millage, and LSC writes about what an act changed. Silence is evidence the rate held and it is not proof, and the FY2020-21 analysis computes neither component.