The corpus › Formula Parameter

Performance Supplement Rate

$13 a pupil per star — the only place Ohio's funding formula pays on a measured outcome. It is in no section of the Revised Code, and per pupil it runs 2.6 times higher in the least-poor fifth of districts than in the poorest.

parameter/performance-supplement-rate · 4 nodes point here · 1 correction

The performance supplement pays $13 × stars × enrolled ADM, where the stars are the greater of the district’s overall rating and its progress component rating. Three routes decide whether a district is paid and none of them sets the amount: an overall rating of four stars or higher, a progress rating of three or higher, or a progress rating higher than the year before. $55.7m statewide to 427 of 609 districts, $32.50 to $65.00 a pupil. verified crates/project/fixtures/enacted-school-funding.txt

It is the only component of Ohio’s current funding formula that pays on a measured outcome. Everything else prices an input — pupils, categories, miles, poverty — or holds a district at a historical amount. This prices the report card. verified the mechanism, and the “only” within FY2026-27

The qualifier is load-bearing. FY2016 through FY2019 had two such components, and they were built the other way round; see findings. verified

Neither the $13 nor the two thresholds is in R.C. 3317. The department computes the supplement on its own sheet and reports it as line [O]; the authority is H.B. 96’s temporary law, which codes.ohio.gov does not carry and which lapses with the biennium unless re-enacted. verified

What this repository computed Contents

Not what Ohio publishes. Figures derived here from committed fixtures, each one citing the test that reproduces it.

Per pupil it runs 2.6 times higher at the top of the wealth distribution Contents

Mean supplement per pupil by fifth of districts, poorest to least poor: $21.84, $30.62, $35.62, $43.51, $55.92. The least-poor fifth receives 2.56 times what the poorest does per pupil. verified

The mechanism is qualification rather than rate: 94% of the least-poor fifth qualifies against 47% of the poorest. The rate is the same $13 everywhere and the outcome it is paid on is not evenly distributed. verified

Ohio has paid on outcomes before, and that time it equalized the payment Contents

Am. Sub. H.B. 64 added a graduation bonus and a third grade reading bonus for FY2016, and Am. Sub. H.B. 49 carried both into FY2018-19. Each paid 7.5% of the formula amount times a count of the pupils who cleared the bar — graduates, or third-graders proficient in reading — and each was then multiplied by the district’s state share index. verified crates/project

That last term is the whole difference. LSC makes its role explicit by describing a version without it: the STEM school payment, it writes, is “identical to the calculation of the payment for traditional districts except that it does not use the state share index.” The state share index is Ohio’s wealth equalizer, so the FY2016 bonuses paid more per qualifying pupil in poorer districts and less in wealthier ones — on top of a qualification rate that already favored the wealthy. verified

The present supplement drops the term. $13 a pupil is $13 a pupil at any valuation, which is why the gradient below runs the way it does. Ohio has paid on a measured outcome twice, and the regressive result is not a property of paying on outcomes; it is a property of paying gross. verified the mechanism inference the reading

The two bonuses ended with the Bridge formula, which computed no formula components at all, and nothing replaced them until FY2026. So this is a mechanism the state has adopted, abandoned and readopted, and the readoption is the version without the equalizer. verified

Which makes it the one line where the formula’s gradient runs the wrong way Contents

Every other component in the plan either equalizes on wealth, weights on need, or pays flat. This one pays more per pupil to districts with less poverty, and it does so through a rate nobody would call regressive on its face. A per-pupil amount paid on an outcome that tracks poverty is a wealth gradient with an extra step in it. inference

Whether that is the intended design — a reward, which by construction goes to those who qualify — or an unexamined consequence, is not established by anything this corpus holds. open

Properties Contents

NamePerformance supplement rate
Unitdollars-per-pupil
KindUncodified. Not in R.C. 3317.022, and not in any other section this corpus cites. The statute audit searched them all; the $13 and the three routes are transcribed from the department's own sheet.

Its authority is the budget act's temporary law, so it has the same three properties as the enrollment supplements: the text is not on codes.ohio.gov, there is no version archive to read a prior value out of, and it ends with the biennium by default.

Being uncodified matters more here than it does for a flat per-pupil grant. This parameter encodes a policy judgment — that the state should pay on measured performance — and it encodes it in a document that is not part of permanent law and that nobody has to vote to let expire.
Values over time
FY2027, from the department's calculator:
  $13     per pupil, per star of the greater rating          line [O]
  4       overall stars to qualify (the sheet's "> 3.5")
  3       progress stars to qualify
Scale, from the committed panel. verified crates/project
  statewide                                  $55,676,980.25
  districts qualifying                          427 of 609
Mean per pupil by poverty fifth:
  poorest                                            $21.84
  second                                             $30.62
  third                                              $35.62
  fourth                                             $43.51
  least poor                                         $55.92
  the ratio between the ends                          2.56x
Share of districts qualifying:
  least-poor fifth                                    94.2%
  poorest fifth                                       47.2%
The prior year is held, and the rate did not move. $13 per pupil in the department's FY2026 calculator and $13 in its FY2027 one, and H.B. 96's analysis states it once for both: "Performance supplement for eligible district = Enrolled ADM x $13 x Report card rating multiplier", with eligibility read off the 2024-2025 report card for FY2026 and the 2025-2026 one for FY2027. So the supplement's reach moves each year with the report card and its price does not. verified crates/project

FY2025 and earlier remain unheld: the FY2025 calculator is truncated at exactly one mebibyte in every archived copy and FY2022 to FY2024 are not in the archive at all. open
Statutory basisNone. Not in R.C. 3317.022 and not in any other section of the Revised Code; the rate and the routes are transcribed from the department's sheet, where the supplement is line [O]. The authority is H.B. 96's temporary law. verified the statute audit
Simulation keyproject::panel::supplements::PERFORMANCE_SUPPLEMENT_PER_POINT, with PERFORMANCE_STAR_THRESHOLD and PERFORMANCE_PROGRESS_THRESHOLD.

Constants, no lever.
Written in formulas as
  • supplement
SensitivityThe rate and the thresholds move different things. $13 scales the whole supplement and does not change who receives it; the two thresholds change who receives it and not the rate. Because qualification already runs 94% against 47% across the wealth range, a threshold change is a distributional lever and a rate change is not. inference

The supplement's cost is a function of the report card, so it moves when ratings move — with no enactment, and on a schedule the funding system does not control. A projection of this line is a projection of statewide school performance. inference

It interacts with nothing else in the formula. It is added after the phase-in and outside the guarantee's base, so unlike the categoricals it is not multiplied by anything. verified crates/project

What this node does not hold Contents

the enrolled act's text and division — H.B. 96's temporary law is where the rate and the three routes live and `codes.ohio.gov` does not carry it. The enrolled act as published by the General Assembly would fix the wording of the third route, which is the one this corpus describes least precisely.

why the state share index was dropped — The FY2016-19 bonuses carried it and this one does not, and no analysis this corpus holds records the change being made or argued. The FY2026-27 enrolled act's temporary law and the testimony on it are where a reason would be.

what the two earlier bonuses paid, by district — The analyses give the formula and not the distribution, so the FY2016-19 gradient cannot be compared with the FY2027 one. The department's payment reports for those years would settle whether equalizing was enough to reverse it.

What this node used to say Contents

The corpus is not rewritten to have always been right. Each entry is a claim this node carried, what replaced it, and the thing that settled it.

Correction 1 of 1

It said

“The performance supplement pays $13 × enrolled ADM for each of three routes a district can qualify on: an overall star rating at or above 3.5, a progress rating at or above 3.0, and a third route the department computes on its own sheet.” The summary called it “$13 a pupil per qualifying rating”, and the series table read “$13 per pupil, per qualifying route” and “3.5 overall star rating threshold”.

It says

The routes decide eligibility and not the amount. The amount is $13 × stars × enrolled ADM, where the stars are the greater of the overall and progress ratings, so it runs from $32.50 to $65.00 a pupil. The overall route needs four stars, not 3.5. The department’s sheet writes it > 3.5, which on a half-star scale is the same set. “At or above 3.5” would admit a 3.5-star district the act excludes.

Settled by

Reading LSC’s final analysis of H.B. 96, committed at crates/project/fixtures/enacted-school-funding.txt, against this node. Section 265.239 pays “$13 multiplied by the greater of the number of ‘stars’” and qualifies at “four ‘stars’ or higher”. formula-component/fsfp-performance-supplement and project::panel::PerformanceSupplement already had it right, and crates/project/tests/what_the_act_says_and_the_code_does_not.rs pins > 3.5 to >= 4.

What else it touched

No figure moves. The per-fifth means, the 2.56 ratio and the qualification shares are computed from the department’s own [O] amount and Q4 eligibility columns, and never from a per-route rebuild, so the misreading stayed in the prose. The same reading was in accountability-regime/ohio-report-card’s table (“$13 a pupil, flat”) and in two crate doc comments (“per qualifying rating”), and all of them are corrected with this one. The rustdoc on PerformanceSupplement also still carried the pre-binding table ($54.74 … $23.31, 2.3 times), which the component node had already recorded as superseded.